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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Conrad Clinton Blair appeals a sentence imposed by 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania.  His appeal implicates a sentencing 
enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act 
(“ACCA”), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and, in particular, presents 
the question of what are prior convictions for “violent 
felon[ies] … committed on occasions different from one 
another… .”  Because we conclude that Blair has at least 
three prior convictions for felonies committed on separate 






In 2011, Blair participated in the sale of guns, even 
though his criminal past rendered him a person prohibited by 
federal law from possessing a firearm.  After his arrest, he 
pled guilty to two counts of being a felon in possession of a 
firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (making it 
“unlawful for any person … who has been convicted in any 
court of[] a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term 
exceeding one year … to … possess … any firearm”).   
 
A presentence investigation report (“PSR”) 
recommended that Blair be sentenced under ACCA, which 
mandates a minimum 15-year prison sentence for anyone 
possessing a firearm after “three previous convictions … for a 
… violent felony … committed on occasions different from 
one another.”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e).  Blair had pled guilty in 
Pennsylvania state court on September 14, 1987, to one count 
of third-degree robbery in the form of “physically tak[ing] or 
remov[ing] property from the person of another by force 
however slight,” in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3701(a)(1)(v), and to one count of armed burglary, in 
violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3502.  On May 6, 1991, 
he had again pled guilty,
1
 this time to four counts of first-
degree robbery in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701.  
The charging documents accompanying the 1991 robbery 
convictions list the counts charged and, for each count, state 
that the “[f]elony committed or threatened” was “[a]ggravated 
                                              
1
 The District Court mistakenly indicated that the 
convictions were entered on May 6, 1990, instead of May 6, 
1991.    
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[a]ssault.”  (App. at 137, 154, 171, 192.)  The PSR 
recommended that each of the 1991 robbery counts be treated 
as a separate criminal episode committed on a separate 
occasion.  The PSR thus calculated that, for purposes of 
ACCA, Blair had six prior convictions, which made him 
subject to the mandatory minimum sentence provided in that 
statute.  Because the advisory Guidelines range fell below the 
mandatory minimum, that minimum of 15 years (180 months) 
became the recommended sentence.   
 
Blair contested the applicability of ACCA, specifically 
arguing as to his 1987 convictions that the burglary 
conviction was not for the generic offense of burglary 
required under ACCA and that robbery by force however 
slight is not a violent felony under ACCA.
2
  Of most 
pertinence for this appeal, he also argued that his 1991 
robbery convictions qualified as, at most, one violent felony 
under ACCA, because they were entered on the same day and 
the charging documents did not conclusively establish that the 
                                              
2
 Blair argues that his 1987 burglary indictment 
charged only burglary generally, which under the 
Pennsylvania statute could include entry into a vehicle or 
yard, and therefore, “the conviction did not necessarily rest on 
all elements of generic burglary” and so is not an ACCA 
predicate.  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 28.)  As to the 1987 
robbery conviction, he says that robbery by force however 
slight, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701(a)(1)(v), does not 
qualify as a “violent felony” under ACCA because it “does 
not have force … as an element, [and it] does not otherwise 
involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of 
physical injury to another.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 29.)  
We make no comment on either of those arguments. 
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crimes were “committed on occasions different from one 
another.”  The District Court reviewed Blair’s prior 
convictions and his objections and determined that his 1987 
robbery and burglary convictions were for violent felonies.  
The Court also held that Blair’s four 1991 robbery 
convictions “at a minimum” established three separate violent 
felonies under ACCA.  (App. at 18.)  “Giving [Blair] the 
benefit of the doubt,” the District Court did not count two of 
the convictions separately because those two robberies were 
committed on the same day.  (Id.)  It thus held that Blair had 
“no fewer” than five predicate violent felonies under ACCA, 
i.e., two 1987 convictions and three 1991 convictions, and so 
applied the ACCA mandatory minimum.  (App. at 18-19.)  
After the District Court sentenced Blair to 180 months in 
prison and three years of supervised release, this timely 






Blair continues to maintain that his 1987 Pennsylvania 
convictions for burglary and robbery do not qualify as ACCA 
predicates because they are not categorically violent felonies.  
He also again argues that his 1991 robbery convictions cannot 
be considered to have been “committed on occasions different 
from one another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), because he pled 
                                              
3
 The District Court had subject matter jurisdiction 
over this case pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and, to the extent Blair 
says his sentence was imposed in violation of law, under 18 
U.S.C. § 3742.  “This appeal presents purely legal questions, 
over which we exercise plenary review.”  United States v. 
Jones, 332 F.3d 688, 690 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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guilty to those charges on the same day.  He has, in addition, 
advanced a new argument based on the Supreme Court’s 
recent holding in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 
(2013), a case which clarifies the analytical approach that 
sentencing courts must use to determine if a prior conviction 
is a predicate offense under ACCA.  Blair now contends that 
his 1991 robbery convictions are not categorically violent 
felonies under ACCA.  Moreover, he says that the Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2151 (2013), holding that facts that increase a mandatory 
minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury, bears on our 
analysis.  While he does not expressly argue that he was 
entitled to a jury determination under Alleyne with respect to 
the predicate offenses for his mandatory minimum sentence, 
he does imply that Alleyne should guide our decision.      
 
We conclude that at least three of Blair’s 1991 robbery 
convictions qualify under ACCA as violent felonies 
committed on separate occasions.  As a result, his 1991 
robbery convictions alone qualify him for the ACCA 
enhancement, and we will affirm the District Court’s 
application of that enhancement without considering Blair’s 
1987 robbery or burglary convictions.  See United States v. 
Berrios, 676 F.3d 118, 129 (3d Cir. 2012) (“We may affirm 
the District Court on any ground supported by the record.”). 
 
A. “Violent Felony” 
 
On May 6, 1991, Blair pled guilty to committing first-
degree felony robbery in violation of Pennsylvania law.  
(App. at 137-38, 154-55, 171-72, 192-93.)  The statute in 
question provides in relevant part: 
7 
 
(1) A person is guilty of robbery if, in the 
course of committing a theft, he: 
 
(i) inflicts serious bodily injury upon 
another; 
(ii) threatens another with or 
intentionally puts him in fear of 
immediate serious bodily injury; 
(iii) commits or threatens immediately to 
commit any felony of the first or second 
degree … . 
 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 3701(a)(1)(i)-(iii). 
 
Robberies under subsections (i), (ii), and (iii) of 
§ 3701(a)(1) are defined as felonies in the first-degree.  Id. at 
§ 3701(b).  Blair pled to four charges of first-degree felony 
robbery in four separate plea agreements.  Each of Blair’s 
signed guilty pleas includes the notation “F1” (indicating 
first-degree) “Robbery.”   (See, e.g., App. at 138.)  For each 
guilty plea, there is a corresponding charging document.  
Each charging document includes counts that are framed in 
the same language as the subsections of § 3701(a)(1).   At the 
bottom of each charging document, there is a line to indicate 
the “[f]elony committed or threatened,” and “[a]ggravated 
[a]ssault” is noted on that line. 4  (App. at 137, 154, 171, 192.)  
The “felony committed or threatened” language is specifically 
akin to the language of § 3701(a)(1)(iii), which, again, makes 
it a first-degree felony to commit a robbery during the course 
                                              
4
 In addition, at the bottom of each charging document 
the name of the victim, the type of property taken, and the 
value of the property taken are described. 
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of which one “commits or threatens immediately to commit 
any felony of the first or second degree … .”  18 Pa. Cons. 
Stat. Ann. § 3701(a)(1)(iii).  Aggravated assault is classified 
as a felony in the first or second degree, id. § 2702(b), and 
clearly involves violence.  Therefore, Blair was charged with 
and pled guilty to four violent first-degree felony robberies.   
 
In his opening and reply briefs, Blair essentially 
conceded that his May 6, 1991, convictions satisfy the 
“violent felony” condition of ACCA.  (Cf. Appellant’s 
Opening Br. at 45 (“The … robberies are not violent felonies 
‘committed on occasions different from one another’ but at 
most count as one violent felony predicate.”); Appellant’s 
Reply Br. at 18 (“For the foregoing reasons and those 
articulated in the opening brief, the 1991 robbery convictions 
count at most as one violent felony … .”).)  But, in a 
supplemental brief addressing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Descamps, and again at oral argument, he has insisted that 
the robbery convictions are not categorically violent felonies.
5
 
    
A prior conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” under 
ACCA if the conviction is for “any crime punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year … that”: (i) “has 
                                              
5
 Blair also argues that the residual clause of ACCA, 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is unconstitutionally vague and that his 
sentence should accordingly be reversed.  But both the 
Supreme Court and our Court have rejected that argument.  
See Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2277 (2011) 
(upholding residual clause against vagueness challenge); 
United States v. Gibbs, 656 F.3d 180, 188-89 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(rejecting “fair notice” argument and holding that the residual 
clause is not unconstitutionally vague). 
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as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person of another;” or (ii) “is 
burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or 
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another… .”  18 U.S.C. 
§§ 924(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii).  
 
In determining whether a defendant’s prior conviction 
serves as an ACCA predicate, we begin our analysis with 
what is called the “categorical approach,” first adopted in 
Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), under which a 
sentencing court compares “the elements of the statute 
forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the 
elements of the ‘generic’ crime – i.e., the offense as 
commonly understood.”  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281; see 
also James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 202 (2007) (“[W]e 
consider whether the elements of the offense are of the type 
that would justify its inclusion within the residual provision 
[of ACCA], without inquiring into the specific conduct of this 
particular offender.”).  When the statute’s elements are “the 
same as, or narrower than” the generic offense, the prior 
conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate.  Descamps, 133 
S. Ct. at 2281.  But if a statute “comprises multiple, 
alternative versions of the crime[,]” id. at 2284, then a court 
may apply the “modified categorical approach” to determine 
which alternative – one that meets the generic offense 
definition or one that does not – formed the basis for the 
conviction.  Id. at 2281.  A statute that includes alternative 
elements is said to be “divisible,” id. at 2283, while one that 
does not is “indivisible.”  Id. at 2281.   
 
The modified categorical approach allows the 
sentencing court to “consult a limited class of documents, 
10 
 
such as indictments and jury instructions,” to determine 
which alternative in a divisible statute was the basis for a 
conviction, and to compare that conviction to the generic 
offense under ACCA.  Id.; see Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602.  
Under the modified categorical approach, a court is therefore 
permitted to “go beyond the mere fact of conviction[,]” 
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, to determine the elements of the 
crime of conviction.  Id.; Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 
13, 20-21 (2005) (holding that, to interpret a conviction 
pursuant to a plea agreement, a sentencing court may look to 
the agreement and plea colloquy in applying the modified 
categorical approach).  The decision in Descamps makes it 
clear that if the relevant statute is indivisible (that is, it does 
not have alternative elements), and if it is overbroad (that is, it 
criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the generic 
offense), then the sentencing court cannot apply the modified 
categorical approach.
6




In Descamps, the Supreme Court rejected the Ninth 
Circuit’s application of the modified categorical approach to a 
California burglary statute.  That statute provides that a 
“person who enters” property “with intent to commit grand or 
petit larceny or any felony is guilty of burglary.” Cal. Penal 
Code § 459 (quoted in Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282).  
Significantly, it “does not require the entry to have been 
unlawful in the way most burglary laws do.”  Descamps, 133 
S. Ct. at 2282.  So, for example, a shoplifter who walks into a 
                                              
6
 In this context, the term “overbroad” has nothing to 
do with the constitutional concept of “overbreadth.”  Rather, 
it is the term the Supreme Court used to describe the scope of 




store like any other business invitee comes within the 
statutory definition of burglary.  Id.  “In sweeping so widely, 
the state law goes beyond the normal, ‘generic’ definition of 
burglary[,]” id., and is therefore overbroad.  The statute is 
also indivisible, because it does not provide any alternative 
definitions of burglary.  Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit, 
relying on its own precedent, see United States v. Aguila-
Montes de Oca, 655 F.3d 915, 940 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(per curiam) (where a statute is “categorically broader than 
the generic offense,” the sentencing court may look at certain 
documents), had ruled that it could apply the modified 
categorical approach.  It looked at the plea colloquy and 
decided that the plea “rested on facts that satisfy the elements 
of generic burglary.”  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2282-83 
(quoting United States v. Descamps, 466 F. App’x 563, 565 
(9th Cir. 2012)).  The Supreme Court reversed and clarified 
that “sentencing courts may not apply the modified 
categorical approach when the crime of which the defendant 
was convicted has a single, indivisible set of elements.”  Id. at 
2282.  The Court stated that the purpose of the modified 
categorical approach is “to identify, from among several 
alternatives, the crime of conviction so that the court can 
compare it to the generic offense.”  Id. at 2285.  If a statute is 
indivisible, it presents no alternatives and the inquiry ends.  
There is simply no reason to turn to the modified categorical 
approach.  Id 
 
Blair tries to make of Descamps something it is not.  
He notes that, although the Pennsylvania robbery statute as a 
whole is divisible, some of its subsections can be viewed as 
indivisible and overbroad.  He then argues that, because the 
charging documents and plea agreement in his case do not say 
which subsection of the robbery statute he was convicted 
12 
 
under in 1991, a sentencing court could properly apply the 
modified categorical approach only to determine which 
statutory subsection criminalized the least culpable behavior 
of which he could have been convicted.  (Appellant’s 
Supplemental Br. at 4 (quoting United States v. Tucker, 703 
F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2012)).)  Since the “least culpable” 
subsection is § 3701(a)(1)(iii), which is overbroad and 
indivisible, he says the court could go no further.  Thus, he 
says, it was error under Descamps for the District Court to 
use the modified categorical approach and review the 
charging documents to determine that the elements of his 
conviction satisfy ACCA.     
 
Given the clearly laid out alternative elements of the 
Pennsylvania robbery statute, it is obviously divisible and, 
therefore, a sentencing court can properly look to the kinds of 
documents listed by the Supreme Court in Taylor and 
Shepard to determine which subsection was the basis of 
Blair’s prior convictions.  Blair acknowledges as much.  
(Appellant’s Supplemental Br. at 3 (citing to the 
Commonwealth’s charging documents and Blair’s guilty 
pleas).)   He could not do otherwise, as logic dictates that a 
court endeavoring to conclude which subsection he pled 
guilty to violating would have to look “to the terms of the 
charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or 
transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which 
the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, 
or to some comparable judicial record of this information.” 7  
                                              
7
 As we discuss more fully herein, because “prior 
convictions that increase the statutory maximum for an 
offense are not elements of the offense,” they “may be 
determined by the District Court by a preponderance of the 
13 
 
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26.  Each of the charging documents for 
the 1991 convictions indicates that Blair pled guilty to first-
degree robbery.      
 
Blair believes a new analysis begins at that point.  
Because the first-degree felony portion of Pennsylvania’s 
divisible robbery statute is itself divisible into subsections (i), 
(ii), and (iii), he says that a sentencing court must “apply the 
modified categorical approach in order to determine the least 
culpable conduct sufficient for a conviction.” (Appellant’s 
Supplemental Br. at 4 (quoting Tucker, 703 F.3d at 214).)  
True enough, that further analytical step is necessary when 
documents a sentencing court has already reviewed do not 
definitively point out which of the statutory subsections was 
violated.  Here they do not, and Blair thinks that that makes 
the documents irrelevant.  He contends that the sentencing 
court may use the first-degree indication in the guilty plea 
only to get as far as identifying the three first-degree robbery 
subsections, and then it must choose the least culpable one 
with no more reference to the charging documents or guilty 
pleas.  Because the least culpable subsection is subsection 
(iii), which criminalizes robbery wherein the perpetrator 
“commits or threatens immediately to commit any felony of 
the first or second degree,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3701(a)(1)(iii), and because some felonies of the first and 
second degree involve no violence, Blair believes he is home 
free.  He is mistaken.   
 
                                                                                                     
evidence.”  United States v. Coleman, 451 F.3d 154, 159 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 
U.S. 224, 243 (1998)).   
14 
 
There is no precedent for the argument that a 
sentencing court, having launched on the modified categorical 
approach, should stop when it gets to a statutory subsection 
and determine again whether to proceed with that approach 
and whether it can consider documents it has already 
reviewed.  The problem is a practical one.  Even if it is true 
that subsection (iii) of § 3701(a)(1) is indivisible and 
categorically overbroad, as Blair says is the case, the 
documents that the District Court had reviewed as part of the 
modified categorical analysis plainly state that the felonies 
associated with his 1991 robbery convictions were 
“aggravated assault.”  (App. at 137, 154, 171, 192.)  The 
search for the applicable subsection in the relevant statute 
does not send the sentencing judge into a state of amnesia.  
To shift the metaphor, the blinders are already off, and there 
is no requirement to pretend otherwise. 
 
Though Blair wishes it were otherwise, Descamps did 
not upend the Supreme Court’s ACCA jurisprudence.  It is a 
straightforward clarification of the uses to which the 
categorical approach and modified categorical approach can 
be put in determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a 
“violent felony” under ACCA.  See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 
2287.  Despite Blair’s arguments, Descamps does not demand 
a recursive process wherein a district court that has already 
pursued the modified categorical approach in addressing a 
divisible statute is required to ignore the charging documents 
and guilty pleas it has just reviewed.  Again, the several 
charging documents associated with the 1991 convictions 
expressly state that the “felony committed or threatened” by 
Blair in each instance was “aggravated assault.”  (App. at 
137, 154, 171, 192.)  Reading each charging document and 
guilty plea as a whole, as the District Court did, it is clear that 
15 
 
Blair “pled guilty to [each such] robbery charge on May 6, 
1991, as a felony of the first degree, thereby admitting that he 
used force causing serious bodily injury or threatened to do so 
and/or threatened to commit aggravated assault in the process 
of committing the robbery.”  (App. at 16-17.)  That is the 
sensible conclusion of the analysis long permitted by the 
modified categorical approach, and Descamps does nothing to 
change it. 
 
In sum, Pennsylvania’s robbery statute is divisible and 
the District Court correctly looked to the charging documents 
to determine that Blair was convicted of a violent felony 
under ACCA.   
 
B. “Committed on Occasions Different from One  
  Another” 
 
Blair next contends that the District Court incorrectly 
applied ACCA because there was insufficient proof that the 
1991 convictions were for offenses committed on different 
occasions, and therefore they at most amount to one predicate 
offense.  As already noted, ACCA’s mandatory minimum 
sentence of 15 years becomes applicable when the defendant 
“has three previous convictions … for a violent felony or a 
serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions 
different from one another… .”  18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) 
(emphasis added).  Blair argues that, because he did not admit 
that the robberies occurred on different occasions when he 
pled guilty to the charges, the enhanced sentence was 
improper under Supreme Court case law and the Fifth and 




In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the 
Supreme Court held that, under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of 
the Sixth Amendment, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted 
to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 490. 
Nevertheless, as is evident from the language of that holding, 
Apprendi did not change the pre-existing rule from 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), 
that a judge, rather than a jury, may determine “the fact of a 
prior conviction.”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.  Recently, in 
Alleyne v. United States, the Supreme Court extended 
Apprendi and held that any facts that increase a mandatory 
minimum sentence must be submitted to a jury and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.  133 S. Ct. 2151, 2158 (2013) 
(overruling Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), 
which held that Apprendi did not apply to facts that increase a 
mandatory minimum sentence).  But the Court expressly 
declined to alter the Almendarez-Torres rule.  Id. at 2160 n.1.  
It observed that, “[b]ecause the parties do not contest that 
decision’s vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our 
decision today.”  Id.  Almendarez-Torres therefore remains “a 
narrow exception to [Apprendi’s] general rule for the fact of a 
prior conviction.”  Id.   
 
Blair tries to distance himself from the continuing 
control of Almendarez-Torres, but he cannot.  Although he 
does not contend that Alleyne or Descamps overrules the 
Almendarez-Torres exception to Apprendi, he urges an 
impermissibly narrow construction of the exception.  Blair 
asserts that it is possible he may have committed some of his 
robberies on the same occasion, “during a single criminal 
17 
 
episode or a continuous course of conduct or simultaneously 
through accomplices.”  (Appellant’s Opening Br. at 51.)  
Determining whether his 1991 convictions were the product 
of a single event or a series of episodes, he says, could only 
have been accomplished by the District Court impermissibly 
looking at “non-elemental” facts associated with the 
convictions.  (Appellant’s Supplemental Br. at 6.)  By “non-
elemental,” he means “amplifying but legally extraneous 
circumstances[,]” as distinct from elements of the offense, the 
elements being the only facts the sentencing court can be sure 
were found by a jury.  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2288.  
Because Descamps condemns any reliance on non-elemental 
facts, even in the application of the modified categorical 
approach, Blair contends that the District Court erred when it 
concluded that the robberies were committed on “occasions 
different from one another” and increased his sentence.  
(Appellant’s Supplemental Br. at 6-7.)   
 
Blair essentially tries to merge Alleyne’s extension of 
Apprendi (covering mandatory minimums) and the holding of 
Descamps (limiting the application of the modified 
categorical approach) to narrow Almendarez-Torres so that a 
court considering an ACCA sentencing enhancement cannot 
take note of information pertaining to a prior conviction, such 
as the date or location of the crimes charged.  He argues that 
Descamps and Alleyne “teach that strict adherence to the 
categorical approach and a narrow reading of the limited 
Almendarez-Torres exception to the rule of Apprendi is 
necessary to avoid Sixth Amendment concerns, and thus 
support … that the sentencing court erred [in this case].”  
(Appellant’s Supplemental Br. at 6-7.)  By his lights, the 
sentencing court “did what Descamps forbids” and looked at 
the non-elemental facts of date, location, and victim to 
18 
 
determine that the felonies were committed on different 
occasions.  (Id. at 8.)   
 
Blair’s arguments fail, however, because Almendarez-
Torres has not been narrowed and remains the law.  Alleyne, 
133 S. Ct. at 2160 n.1.  Descamps and Alleyne do nothing to 
restrict the established exception under Almendarez-Torres 
that allows judges to consider prior convictions.  When the 
pertinent documents show, as they do in this case, that the 
prior convictions are for separate crimes against separate 
victims at separate times, Alleyne does not somehow muddy 
the record and convert the separateness issue into a jury 
question.  Alleyne was written against the backdrop of 
Almendarez-Torres and existing ACCA jurisprudence.  Had 
the Supreme Court meant to say that all details related to prior 
convictions are beyond judicial notice, it would have said so 
plainly, as that would have been a marked departure from 
existing law. 
 
Arguments like Blair’s have been rejected by 
numerous courts.  See, e.g., United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 
1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[F]or ACCA purposes, district 
courts may determine both the existence of prior convictions 
and the factual nature of those convictions, including whether 
they were committed on different occasions … .”); United 
States v. Elliott, 703 F.3d 378, 382 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[A] 
district court [may] make a finding for purposes of the ACCA 
as to whether a defendant committed three or more violent 
felonies or serious drug offenses on occasions different from 
one another.”); United States v. Thomas, 572 F.3d 945, 952 
n.4 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing cases); United States v. Hendrix, 
509 F.3d 362, 376 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he district court’s 
determination from the PSR that [the defendant] had three 
19 
 
previous convictions to satisfy the Armed Career Criminal 
Act is not impermissible factfinding, and [the defendant’s] 
sentence does not violate the Sixth Amendment.”); United 
States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1133 (10th Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]hether prior convictions happened on different 
occasions from one another is not a fact required to be 
determined by a jury but is instead a matter for the sentencing 
court.”); United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 285 (4th 
Cir. 2005) (“The data necessary to determine the 
‘separateness’ of the occasions is inherent in the fact of the 
prior convictions.”); United States v. Burgin, 388 F.3d 177, 
186 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he determinations by a district court 
that prior felony convictions exist and were committed on 
different occasions, are so intimately related that the 
‘different occasions’ requirement of § 924(e) sufficiently 
comes within the exception in Apprendi for a prior 
conviction.  Thus, … this issue need not be pled in an 
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”); United States v. Santiago, 268 F.3d 151, 
157 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[Section] 924(e)’s ‘different occasions’ 
requirement falls safely within the range of facts traditionally 
found by judges at sentencing and is sufficiently interwoven 
with the facts of the prior crimes that Apprendi does not 
require different fact-finders and different burdens of proof 
for Section 924(e)’s various requirements.”).   We agree with 
that wide consensus and conclude that neither Descamps nor 
Alleyne undermines the District Court’s “fact of a prior 
conviction” analysis. 
 
The 1991 convictions cover four robberies committed 
in October of 1990.  According to the charging documents, 
one robbery occurred “on or about” October 20, a second 
robbery occurred “on or about” October 22, and two 
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robberies occurred “on or about” October 23.  Although the 
dates charged were not elements of the offenses, the charging 
documents nonetheless contained factual matter that was 
sufficient for the District Court to conclude that Blair’s 1991 
convictions were for at least three robberies that occurred on 
separate occasions.
8
  Indeed, the date of an offense is integral 
to the fact of a prior conviction, and is customarily reflected 
in the kinds of documents that courts may, under Shepard and 
Taylor, use to determine whether a prior conviction exists.   
 
The offenses at issue here occurred on separate 
occasions  because “the criminal episodes [were] distinct in 
time[,]” United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 73 (3d Cir. 
1989) (citations omitted)(internal quotation marks omitted), 
and targeted “different geographic locations and victims,” 
Thompson, 421 F.3d at 285.  See also United States v. Pope, 
132 F.3d 684, 692 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
defendant’s convictions for burgling two different doctor’s 
offices located 200 yards apart constitute two crimes, even 
though the two burglaries were separated by only moments); 
United States v. Brady, 988 F.2d 664, 668-70 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(en banc) (holding that two armed robberies, separated in 
time by less than an hour, are two convictions).
9
  
                                              
8
 There is a good argument to be made that all four of 
the 1991 convictions took place on separate occasions, 
because even the robberies that occurred on the same day 
were committed at locations roughly two miles from each 
other, and each involved a separate victim.  But we need not 
reach that conclusion here, as we may affirm the District 
Court based on three prior convictions.   
9
 For those reasons, Blair’s invocation of United States 
v. Fuller, 453 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2006), does not help his 
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Accordingly, the District Court’s conclusion that Blair’s 1991 
convictions qualify as at least three predicate offenses under 
ACCA was correct, as was the imposition of the mandatory 




                                                                                                     
cause.  The Fuller court held that multiple burglary 
convictions were not necessarily for crimes committed on 
separate occasions when the indictment did not indicate 
whether the defendant had pled guilty to entering separate 
apartment units in the same complex, or simply to standing as 
a lookout as his accomplice entered the apartments.  Id. at 
279-80.  The court recognized, however, that the case 
“turn[ed] on whether [the burglaries] occurred sequentially, 
as the district court held that they did, or simultaneously,” 
because “[t]he critical inquiry when deciding whether 
separate offenses occurred on ‘occasions different from one 
another’ for purposes of the ACCA is whether the offenses 
occurred sequentially.”  Id.  If they were sequential, meaning 
that one crime came to an end before the next commenced, 
they occurred on separate occasions.  Id.  Here, the charging 
documents clearly indicated that, at least as to the robberies 
occurring on different days, each of Blair’s robberies had 
been completed before the next commenced.  They were 
separated in both time and distance and therefore could not be 
said to be a continuation of one crime. 
10
 Because we do not see any ambiguity as to whether 
ACCA applies here, we also reject Blair’s argument that the 
rule of lenity should apply.  “The rule of lenity requires 
ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the 
defendants subjected to them.”  United States v. Santos, 553 





For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Blair’s 
sentence. 
